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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This
pursuant

appeal
to

is

from

a bench

a

final

trial held

Judgment

on June

entered

22, 1990.

Judgment was entered on July 25, 1990. The Utah Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal pursuant
to U.C.A., §78-2-2(3) (j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Does

§57-1-32, U.C.A.

apply

to Associates

Financial Services as a non-foreclosing junior lienholder
when Associates bid at the foreclosure sale of the senior
1

lienor, but was redeemed out of the property prior to
commencement of the lawsuit?
Since this matter was heard as a bench trial (see
Appendix lfClf) and not as a summary judgment, the standard
for review of the evidence is to be in a light most
favorable to the prevailing party at the bench trial.
There is to be no reversal of the decision of the trial
court on the facts, only if there was an error of law.
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Ut.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961);
Briaham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, 470 P.2d 393, 24 Ut.2d
292 (1970).

Since the appeal presents only questions of

law, the court should review the trial court's rulings
for correctness and accord no particular deference to the
appellant.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City

Corp.. 752 P.2d 585 (Ut 1988).
2.

Should the fair market value of real estate

sold at a foreclosure sale on a senior lien be examined
pursuant to

§57-1-32, U.C.A. under a non-deficiency

action taken by Associates Financial Services, the junior
lienor, when Associates was not the title holder to the
real estate at the time of the commencement of the action
for collection of the balance due under its note?
2

The standard for review of the evidence is to be in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party from the
trial court. The decision of the trial court should not
be reversed unless there is an error of law. Charlton v.
Hackett, supra; Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, supra. The legal
conclusions of the trial court should be reviewed for
correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City

Corp., supra.
3.

As

a

purchasing

junior

lienor

at

the

foreclosure sale of a senior lien, is Associates barredfrom action against appellants pursuant to §78-37-1,
U.C.A. when Associates was redeemed out of the property
prior to the commencement of the lawsuit?
The standard for review of the evidence is to be in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party from the
trial court. The decision of the trial court should not
be reversed unless there is an error of law. Charlton v.
Hackett, supra; Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n. supra. The legal
conclusions of the trial court should be reviewed for
correctness.

Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City

Corp., supra.

3

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
U.C.A., §57-1-32
At any time within three months after any
sale of property under a trust deed, as
hereinabove provided, an action may be
commenced to recover the balance due upon the
obligation for which the trust deed was given
as security, and in such action the complaint
shall set forth the entire amount of the
indebtedness which was secured by such trust
deed, the amount for which such property was
sold, and the fair market value thereof at the
date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the
court shall find the fair market value at the
date of sale of the property sold. The court
may not render judgment for more than the
amount by which the amount of the indebtedness
with interest, costs, and expenses of sale,
including trustee's and attorney's fees,
exceeds the fair market value of the property
as of the date of the sale. In any action
brought under this section, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to collect its costs
and reasonable attorney fees incurred in
bringing an action under this section.
U.C.A., §78-37-1
There can be one action for the recovery
of any debt or the enforcement of any right
secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the
provision of this chapter. Judgment shall be
given adjudging the amount due, with costs and
disbursements, and the sale of mortgage
property, or some part thereof, to satisfy
said amount and accruing costs, and directing
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same
according to the provisions of law relating to
sales on execution, and a special execution or
4

order of
purpose.

sale

shall

be

issued

for

that

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal by appellants, Franklin L.
Slaugh and Cheryl D. Slaugh from a final judgment entered
pursuant to a bench trial held on June 22, 1990.

The

parties stipulated to the facts of the case and agreed
that the matter could be tried on the basis of oral
arguments of counsel only.

R.147.

The court, pursuant

to the bench trial, entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and an Order and Judgment. R.152-158.
The defendants did not object to the facts set forth in
the Findings of Fact which had been stipulated to at the
bench trial. The Judgment against defendants is for the
sum of $2 6,089.71, together with interest in the sum of
$3,848.13 and

for attorney's fees in the amount of

$3,000.00, for a total judgment of $32,935.84, which
judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 18% per annum
from and after July 25, 1990. (See Appendix "A").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts which are set forth in the Findings of
Facts and Conclusions of Law (which had been stipulated
5

to at the bench trial of June 22, 1990) are as follows:
R. 147, 152-155.
1.

Defendants,

Franklin

and

Cheryl

Slaugh

(Slaughs), entered into a loan agreement with Plaintiff,
Associates Financial Services (Associates), on or about
November 26, 1982.
2.

The loan agreement included a note in the

amount of $33,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in
the Note.
3.

The note was secured by a trust deed on real

property located at 8620 South Gladiator Way, Sandy,
Utah.
4.

The lien of Associates was a second mortgage on

the property.
5.

The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage

Loan Corporation (Utah Mortgage).
6.

Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into

default on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go
into default on the Associates trust deed.
7.
commenced

Because
a

of

Slaughs

non-judicial

default, Utah

foreclosure

and

Mortgage

eventually

conducted a trustee's sale on the real property.
6

8.

The trustee's sale occurred on February 28,

1989. Associates appeared at the sale and bid an amount
of $26,000.00 as the high bid. The amount owing to Utah
Mortgage was approximately $20,000.00 at the time of the
sale.
9.

The value of the real property at the time of

sale was more than $40,000.00, although the exact market
value has not been established.
10.

At the time of the foreclosure sale there were

unreleased federal tax liens against Slaughs which were
also liens on the real estate.
11.

The branch manager of Associates, who attended

the sale, did not actually know about the federal tax
liens, although they were of record.
12.

Associates1

file on Slaughs was in Dallas,

Texas at the time of the sale. The file did have a copy
of a title report that identified the federal tax liens.
13.

Under federal law, the IRS has a 12 0-day right

of redemption on any trustee's sale when a lien is in
place.

As a result of the 120-day right of redemption,

the IRS paid Associates the sum of $26,000.00 within 120days of the sale to cover the high bid at sale.
7

14.

The IRS took title to the real property under

the redemption and wiped out any interest of Associates
in the property.

The net proceeds of the redemption to

Associates was approximately $5,700.00, which amount was
applied to the account of Slaughs to reduce the balance
owing.
15.

The balance of the Note and Trust Deed, after

redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with
interest from September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the
Note.
16.

No payments have been made by

Slaughs to

Associates since the redemption by the IRS.
17.

The Note provided for an award of attorney's

fees in the event it is necessary to enforce collection
of the Note.
(See Appendix "B" for the stipulated Findings of
Fact.)
Based upon the foregoing stipulated facts, Appellee
disputes the following statement of fact found at pages
4 and 5 of the Appellants1 Brief:
It was

stipulated

that the value

of

the real

property at the time of sale was more than $40,000.00,
8

although the exact market value had not been established.
Therefore, the representation of appellants in paragraph
"(e)11 as to a specific value of the property and an
amount owing to Associates at the time of sale is
inappropriate.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Since Associates

Financial

Services was a

junior lienor at the time of the sale of a senior lien,
it is not governed by the deficiency action statute, §571-32, U.C.A.
purchased

The

fact

the property

that Associates

at the

originally

sale, but was later

redeemed out by the IRS, does not change this effect
since

the

pertinent

portions

of

distinction between a purchasing

§57-1-32

make

no

or a nonpurchasing

junior lienor.
2.

Since the three month limitation contained in

§57-1-32, U.C.A. does not apply to a nonforeclosing
junior lienor, the fair market provisions of that statute
also do not apply to limit the appellee's recovery under
a note sued upon by the said junior lienor.
3.

The security was lost by reason of defaults of

the appellants. Associates could not have prevented the
9

loss of the security.

There was also no breach of any

duty by Associates. Therefore, the One-Action Rule does
not apply to this action.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS ACTION IS NOT GOVERNED BY §57-1-32
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SINCE THIS IS NOT AN
ACTION FOR A DEFICIENCY.
Citv Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234
(Utah 1991) is controlling on the interpretation of §571-32, U.C.A.

The court, in recognizing that the 3-month

rule did not apply to a non-foreclosing junior lien
holder, stated the following:
We have not heretofore had occasion to
determine whether the fair market value
limitation of section 57-1-32 applies to a
"sold out nonforeclosing junior lienor."
However, the Utah Court of Appeals, in a
recent decision, declined to apply the threemonth limitation contained in section 57-1-3 2
to a nonforeclosing junior.
G. Adams Ltd.
Partnership v. Durbano, 782 P. 2d 962 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) .
The court reasoned that the
statute only applied to a creditor who had
foreclosed. Since the second lienor had not
foreclosed, section 57-1-32 did not apply.
Id. at 963.
Consistent with this ruling, we hold that
since City, a sold-out junior, is unsecured,
it is not pursuing a "deficiency judgment"
and, therefore, the statute would not apply.
10

As a result* City is not limited by the fair
market value provision of section 57-1-32 from
pursuing
its claim
against the debtor
personally. Id. at 239.
The City Consumer Services v. Peters case also
defines the phrase "sold-out junior lienor" as being a
"creditor originally secured by a second lien against
real property, but unsecured as a result of the senior's
foreclosure."

Id. at 23 6.

Associates was in a second

lien position to that of Utah Mortgage. R.153.

Utah

Mortgage completed a foreclosure which extinguished the
second lien of Associates. R.153. Therefore, Associates
meets the definition of a "sold out junior lienor".

As

a sold out junior lienor, Associates was not pursuing a
deficiency judgment against Slaughs and, therefore,
§57-1-32 would not apply.
The fact that Associates originally purchased
the property at the sale, but was later redeemed out by
the IRS does not change this effect since the pertinent
portions of

§57-1-32 make no distinction between a

purchasing or a nonpurchasing junior lienor.
states the following:

11

§57-1-32

At any time within three months after any sale
of property under a trust deed as hereinafter
provided, an action may be commenced to
recover the balance due on the obligation for
which the trust deed was given as security and
in such action the complaint shall set forth
the entire amount of the indebtedness which
was secured by such trust deed . . . (emphasis
added).
The language of the code clearly does not apply to a lien
holder other than the one who has foreclosed its interest
in the property.
The appellant has cited and relied heavily on the
reasoning of the case of Citrus State Bank v. McKendrick,
215 Cal. 3d 941, 263 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. App., 2 Dist.,
1989) . However, this case is not controlling since the
City Consumer v. Peters case has interpreted the law for
Utah.

But, the Citrus State Bank case follows the same

reasoning as the City Consumer case.

The court stated:

Thus a sold out junior lienor whose interest
is lost by virtue of a senior foreclosure is
free to sue directly on his unpaid and now
unsecured note and is not encumbered by the
provisions of section 580(a).
That is, the
amount of the deficiency is not limited.
There is no need to obtain a fair market
appraisal of the secured property and it is
not necessary that an action be commenced
within three months of the foreclosure sale.
Id. at 784.

12

It is true that the Citrus State Bank case holds
that the purchase of the secured property by a junior
lienor caused the junior lienor to be governed by the
deficiency

action rule.

This is because the court

reasoned that a purchaser should not gain the advantage
of receiving the security and also have the right to take
an action for the balance unless the deficiency action
rule applies.

However, the Citrus State Bank situation

does not correspond to our case.

Associates did not

receive the property and also bring an action for a
deficiency.

Prior to the commencement of the action,

Associates was redeemed out of the property by the IRS
and was left with only a partial payment toward the debt.
R.154.
A redemption, by definition, is "a repurchase;
a buying back... The process of annulling and revoking a
conditional

sale of property, by performance of the

conditions on which it was stipulated to be revoked."
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition (1979) . Thus by the
redemption, the act of bidding at the sale by Associates
was cancelled out, annulled and revoked.

13

The effect is

as though the IRS made the high bid at sale in the amount
of $26,000.00.
II.
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS
ACTION AND, THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT OF
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES SHOULD NOT BE
LIMITED THROUGH ANY EXAMINATION REGARDING
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY.
The

appellants,

throughout

their

brief,

have

referred to and relied upon an analysis of the value of
the property. It is clear that the value of the property
was not an issue at the trial since the value was not
finally established as part of the stipulated facts.
R.153.

It should also be noted that the timing of a

right of redemption of the IRS is not consistent with the
three month limitation for a deficiency action.

The IRS

has 120-days to redeem and the rule of §57-1-32 only
provides for three months to take action.

Therefore,

under the appellants1 reasoning, a junior lienholder who
might opt for retention of property in lieu of a lawsuit
would be left without a right of action if a redemption
occurs more than 90 days but less than 120 days after the
sale.
14

Since

fair

market

value

was

neither

finally

established nor treated as a determinative issue at the
trial court and since Associates qualifies as a sold out
junior lienor, the fair market provisions of §57-1-32
also do not apply. This court need not exam value of the
property.

There simply is no risk that Associates would

receive both the title to the property as well as an
opportunity to obtain a large deficiency because of the
prior redemption.
It is consistent with the City Consumer Services
case that if a deficiency action is not required under
§57-1-32, then the "fair market value" provisions of §571-32 also do not apply.

Therefore, the appellant has

improperly requested the examination of the fair market
value of the real estate.
III.
THE "ONE ACTION RULE" DOES NOT BAR
APPELLEE FROM RECOVERY OF THE AMOUNTS
DUE UNDER ITS NOTE.
The Utah Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that
the

"One Action

Rule" as established

by Utah Code

Annotated, §78-37-1 does not apply to circumstances where
the security has been lost or is valueless. Cache Valley
15

Banking Co. v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, 618 P.2d 43, 45
(Utah 1980) and Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty Inc.,
657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).

In the case of Utah Mortgage

& Loan Company v. Black, 618 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1980) the
Court stated, in speaking of the "One Action Rule", as
follows:
When the security has been lost or disposed of
without any fault or blameworthy conduct on
the part of the creditor. . .an action may be
brought on the note without going through a
fruitless procedure of foreclosure on nonexistent security.
In the case now before this court, an action in
foreclosure would be

fruitless since Associates has

already lost its security on the property through the
nonjudicial foreclosure by the senior lienor. Appellants
are trying to shift their blameworthy conduct and burdens
to the appellee. The existence of the federal tax liens,
under which redemption occurred, was a result of a
failure on the part of the Slaughs —
taxes.

the failure to pay

Slaughs were also in default under the first

trust deed on the property. That default resulted in the
foreclosure.

Associates had nothing to do with the

defaults and tax delinquency of Slaughs.

16

The U.S. District Court in First Security Bank of
Utah, N.A. v. Felger, 658 F.Supp. 175, 182 (D. Utah 1987)
stated:
The courts have found that a creditor is
precluded from seeking a deficiency only where
the creditor's negligence, or illegal conduct,
has resulted in the loss of the collateral, or
where the creditor voluntarily released the
junior lien, (emphasis added).
The appellants have not asserted that Associates engaged
in any illegal conduct.

They do claim that Associates

was negligent.
In order for a claim of negligence to apply, there
must be a duty of care. Williams v. Nelby, 699 P. 2d 793
(Utah 1985).

Since the first essential element of

negligence is a duty of reasonable care by a defendant to
a plaintiff, it is necessary for appellants to set forth
a legal standard for the duty they claim Associates owed.
Associates had no duty to bid anything at the
foreclosure sale. Associates owed no duty at the time of
bidding to bid an amount that approximated the value of
the property, nor did they later have any obligation to
determine that the redemption amount paid by the IRS may
not have been higher.

Arguably, if Associates had not
17

bid $26,000, the judgment which has now been entered
against

the

Slaughs

would

be

for

a

higher

sum.

Therefore, Slaughs obtained the benefit by the bidding.
The facts show that the security was lost because
the Slaughs failed to keep the first note and trust deed
current.

No matter what happened at the sale, the

security would have been lost.

Whether Associates bid

higher, or not at all, the sale still would have been
concluded.

Therefore, the security was not lost because

of any conduct of Associates.

It was lost because the

Slaughs allowed the default and incurred the liability
for federal tax liens. It is rather impertinent now for
the Slaughs to claim that the loss of the security
occurred as a result of some breach of an unknown duty by
Associates.
The City Consumer Services case also makes it clear
that the "One Action Rule" does not apply to a "sold out
junior lienor."

This court stated:

Our Cache Valley decision, that the one-action
rule does not apply to a "sold out junior," is
consistent with the purpose of the one-action
rule to bar multiple suits against a debtor
who has defaulted.
It is well established
that statutes should be construed and applied
in accordance with their legislative purpose.
18

Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm'n, 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980). As
a result, we hold today that the one-action
rule does not apply to the facts of this case
to deny the junior lienor its right to
recover. The purpose of the one-action rule
is to regulate the procedure of recovery of a
secured creditor, not to deny the creditors
contract right to recover on its loan.
Therefore, when a junior becomes unsecured due
to foreclosure by the senior lienor, the
junior is not barred by the one-action rule
from proceeding against the debtor on the
note, since the creditor's status as to
security is determined at the time the suit is
brought. (emphasis added). Id. at 237.
At the time the suit was brought in this action, the
property had been redeemed by the IRS.
foreclosed

and

lost

through

a

It had been

foreclosure

by

Utah

Mortgage, not Associates, and was not controlled or owned
by Associates.
Associates can not be chargeable with fault in
receiving the redemption price paid by the IRS.

Title

28, U.S.C, §2410(d) reads as follows:
In any case in which the United States redeems
real property under this section or section
7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the
amount to be paid for such property shall be
the sum of —
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser
at such sale (which, in the case of a
purchaser who is the holder of the lien being
19

foreclosed, shall include the amount of the
obligation secured by such lien to the extent
satisfied by reason of such sale),
(2)
interest on the amount paid (as
determined under paragraph (1) at 6 per cent
per annum from the date of such sale, and
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess
of (A) the expenses necessarily incurred in
connection with such property, over (B) the
income from such property plus (to the extent
such property is used by the purchaser) a
reasonable rental value of such property,
(emphasis Added).
There is nothing in the language of §2410(d) that makes
it clear that Associates was entitled to any amount over
and above the redemption paid of $26,000.00, plus 6%
interest.
It is hereby acknowledged by appellant that the Bank
of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981)
has interpreted §2410(d)(1) differently than the strict
construction of the language of §2410(d) would suggest.
Therefore, it appears that Associates may have been able
to demand a higher redemption amount than the IRS paid.
However, it does not necessarily follow that Associates
must seek the highest possible redemption price from the
IRS in the event of a redemption.
20

Again, this would

impose a duty upon Associates which does not exist at
law.

Associates acted reasonably in the receipt of the

redemption price paid and should not be required to have
sued the IRS in order to receive a higher payment just in
order to reduce the claim under the note signed by the
Slaughs.
If Associates were bound by the "One Action Rule",
it would lead to a senseless, fruitless, and redundant
trustee's sale on the property which has already been
foreclosed

and

lost to the IRS through redemption.

Associates would record a notice of default and conduct
a foreclosure sale under which it would bid zero.

The

parties would then be back in court to claim a deficiency
for the same amounts which are set forth in the judgment
that was already entered.

This is all the more reason

not to create a new duty of care on a junior lienor
during the bidding process at the sale of a senior lien.
CONCLUSION
As a "sold out junior lienor", Associates is not
bound by the deficiency action rule of §57-1-32, U.C.A.
The fact that Associates purchased at the sale and was
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later redeemed out of the property should not create- a
new exception to the general rule, especially when the
IRS redemptions occur after the expiration of three
months and prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.
No duty of care exists for a junior lien holder at
the foreclosure sale of a senior lien, because the sale
of the senior lien will extinguish the other liens on the
property, no matter what a junior lienor does.

The

Slaughs had the duty of care to protect the property from
foreclosure so that the lien of Associates would not be
extinguished.

The Slaughs1 breach of their duty of care

should not be ignored or shifted to a party that was not
foreclosing
Associates

the
may

trust
have

deed.

been

able

The

mere

fact

to

obtain

a

that

higher

redemption through the IRS or through the bidding on the
property and subsequent sale thereof, does not constitute
negligence or fault within the meaning of §78-37-1,
U.C.A.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z/(

day of March,

1992.
^mxty W. CANNON
Actprney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby declare that I caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, four (4) copies of Appellee's Brief to
the following on the S)\

day of March, 1992:

Franklin L. Slaugh, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
9341 South 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84094
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BRYAN W. CANNON
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
40 East South Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
a Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Civil No. 890906166
JUDGE UNO

vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,

l-STl -<iO-%lla^.

Defendants.

This matter came on regularly for oral argument before
the above entitled Court on June 22, 1990 before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno.

The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiff is hereby
granted judgment against defendants as follows:
1.

For Judgment in the principal sum of $26,087.71,

together with interest in the sum of $3,848.13.
2.

For a reasonable attorney's fee in the sum of

$3,000.00.

APPENDIX "A11

The total Judgment of $32,935.84 shall bear interest at
the rate of 18% until paid in fullv
DATED this %5~

day of ^ a etey
j 1990.

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

00158

Tiv.ro Judicial C<stnct

BRYAN W. CANNON, #0561
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH
Attorneys for Plaintiff
40 East South Temple, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2100

JUL 1 5 1990
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
a Corporation,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 890906166
JUDGE UNO

vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,
Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for oral
argument on the 22nd day of June, 1990, before the Honorable
Raymond S. Uno at the hour of 9:00 A.M.

Bryan W. Cannon appeared

for the plaintiff, and Franklin L. Slaugh appeared pro se and as
attorney for Cheryl D. Slaugh. Based upon the stipulations of fact
and oral arguments of counsel, the Court hereby enters its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Defendants, Franklin and Cheryl Slaugh (Slaughs),

entered into a loan agreement with plaintiff, Associates Financial
1

APPENDIX "B"

001^2

Services (Associates), on or about November 26, 1982.
2.

The loan agreement included a note in the amount of

$33,104.14, plus interest accruing as shown in the Note.
3.

The note was secured by a trust deed on real

property located at 8620 South Gladiator Way, Sandy, Utah.
4.

The lien of Associates was a second mortgage on the

5.

The senior lien was in favor of Utah Mortgage Loan

property.

Corporation (Utah Mortgage).
6.

Prior to February of 1989, Slaughs went into default

on the Utah Mortgage trust deed but did not go into default on the
Associates trust deed.
7.

Because of Slaughs1 default, Utah Mortgage commenced

a non-judicial foreclosure and eventually conducted a trustee's
sale on the real property.
8.

The trustee's sale occurred on February 28, 1989.

Associates appeared at the sale and bid an amount of $26,000.00 as
the high bid.

The amount owing to Utah Mortgage was approximately

$20,000.00 at the time of the sale.
9.

The value of the real property at the time of sale

was more than $40,000.00, although the exact market value has not
been established.
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10.

At the time of the foreclosure sale there were

unreleased federal tax liens against Slaughs which were also liens
on the real estate.
11.

The branch manager of Associates, who attended the

sale, did not actually know about the federal tax liens, although
they were of record.
12.

Associates1 file on Slaughs was in Dallas, Texas at

the time of the sale.

The file did have a copy of a title report

that identified the federal tax liens.
13.

Under federal law, the IRS has a 120-day right of

redemption on any trustee's sale when a lien is in place.

As a

result of the 120 day right of redemption, the IRS paid Associates
the sum of $26,000.00 within 120-days of the sale to cover the high
bid at sale.
14.

The IRS took title to the real property under the

redemption

and wiped

out

any

interest

of

Associates

in the

property.

The net proceeds of the redemption to Associates was

approximately $5,700.00, which amount was applied to the account
of Slaughs to reduce the balance owing.
15.

The balance

of the Note and Trust Deed, after

redemption, was the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest from
September 1989 pursuant to the terms of the note.

3
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16.

No payments have been made by Slaughs to Associates

since the redemption by the IRS.
17.

The Note provides for an award of attorney's fees

in the event it is necessary to enforce collection of the Note.
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW
1.

Associates, as a junior lien purchaser at the sale

of a senior trust deed is not bound by the Section 57-1-32, Utah
Code Annotated, 3-month right of action rule when the IRS exercises
a 120-day right of redemption.
2.

Section 78-37-1, Utah Code Annotated ("One-Action-

Rule11 ) did not require Associates to first conduct a non-judicial
foreclosure before bringing its action for the balance of its debt,
since the security was lost, not through the fault of Associates,
but because of failures by Slaughs.
3.

Plaintiff, Associates, is entitled to a Judgment

against Slaughs in the sum of $26,089.71, together with interest
from and after September of 1989 pursuant to the terms of the Note
and for a reasonable attorney's fee for prosecution of this action.
DATED this <2~*

day of July, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

^^^^r-r-T^-^^ ^

^yOof^-

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby declare that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, this

^~7

day of

July, 1990, to the following:
Franklin L« Slaugh, Esq.
Pro Se and as
Attorney for Cheryl Slaugh
9341 South 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84092

'//>?

Y^ry\

00156

,v*iT r ^ ^ C T

JUL 0 2 1990
«'. > £ * Y '

/fQ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES,
a corporation,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

890906166

Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANKLIN L. SLAUGH and
CHERYL D. SLAUGH,
Defendants.

This

matter

June, 1990.
that

the

came

on

for

bench

The parties stipulated

trial on the 22nd day of

to

the

facts

and

agreed

case could be tried based on oral argument of counsel

only.

After argument of counsel,

under

advisement.

The

the

Court

took

the

matter

Court now being fully advised and good

cause appearing therefore, rules as follows.
Plaintiff

is entitled to Judgment against the defendants in

the sum of $26,089.71
1989

pursuant

to

together
terms

of

with
the

interest
note,

from

minus

any

September
offsets

defendants can legally assert.
The

Court agrees with plaintiff's contention that since the

IRS became the purchaser

of

the

APPENDIX "C"

property

from

the

closure,
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Associates

should

PAGE TWO

not

be

bound

by

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the three month right of

action rule, nor should Associates be required to first
a

non-judicial

foreclosure

before

bringing an action for the

balance of its debt, since the security was
the

fault

of

Associates,

but

conduct

lost,

because

of

not

through

failures

by

defendants.
Plaintiff is to prepare the Order.
Dated this

.day of July, 1990.

D
RAYMONT) S. UNO L
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

00J48
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ASSOCIATES V. SLAUGH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true
of

the

foregoing

Memorandum

Decision,

and

correct

copy

to the following,

this ^&(_day of July, 1990:

Bryan W. Cannon
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 E. South Temple, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin L. Slaugh
Pro se
9341 South 1300 East
Sandy, Utah 84094
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